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Abstract
The growing demand for mobile Internet, and the increasing number of con-
nected devices, has required significant advancements in radio technology
and networks compared to the previous generations of mobile telecommuni-
cation. Security however has only seen incremental changes to the previous
mobile telecommunication generation, with enhancements that mitigate new
threats and address revealed weaknesses. 5G is expected to change this, as
novel use-cases will demand new trust models and require novel security
solutions.
In this paper, we examine the state of 5G Security, and start by describ-
ing the new expectations, requirements and enablers in 5G and the design
principles conferred by material presented in selected publications. Further-
more, we describe the historic development of the authentication and key
agreement protocols, which were introduced with GSM (2G), as an example
of the incremental improvements to security. Additionally, we present se-
lect published papers that suggest di erent types of attacks on the current
generations of mobile networks, and solutions to the identified weaknesses,
which must be taken into account in 5G security. Finally, we describe a pro-
posed 5G Security architecture, which bring new models for authentication,
authorization and accounting (AAA) to 5G.
The role of 5G security is clear, it must not only meet the basic security
requirements in confidentiality, integrity and privacy, but also foster user
confidence in mobile telecommunication.
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1 Introduction
The growing demand for mobile Internet and increasing number of connected
devices have introduced new capacity requirements for mobile telecommuni-
cations. Until today, the requirements have mainly been addressed with new
physical radio transmission technologies that deliver higher bandwidth and
lower latency. Despite the significant evolution of mobile Internet and ma-
jor advancements in radio technology, the individual steps in security have
often been based on incremental changes to the previous mobile telecommu-
nication generation. New releases have brought security enhancements to
mitigate new threats and to address revealed weaknesses. This is expected
to change for 5G security. Novel use cases bring new types of requirements,
in addition to bandwidth and latency improvements, hence 5G needs to be
secured from its foundations.
We begin this report by summarizing published 5G visions, use cases
and expectations in Section 2. These visions and use cases will in turn drive
new requirements in the 5G architecture, requiring new enablers, which we
describe in Section 3. In section 4 we focus on Software-defined Network-
ing (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and motivate their
importance as enablers of 5G. We start the security aspects in Section 5 by
describing the evolution of security considerations from GSM to the current
version, Long Term Evolution (LTE, 4G). Considering that 5G security must
take into account known weaknesses in universal mobile telecommunications
system (UMTS, 3G) and LTE, we provide a description of select weaknesses
and attacks in 5.2. We conclude the chapter with a proposed 5G security
architecture from an active 5G research project. We conclude this report in
Section 6 with a discussion and summary of some key points.
2 Expectations, Use Cases, and Requirements for
5G
The evolution of mobile telecommunication technology has been extraordi-
nary in terms of available bandwidth and latency, which still remain impor-
tant requirements for the development of new solutions. 3G brought inte-
grated voice and mobile Internet, LTE drastically improved bandwidth and
latency capabilities, and LTE Advanced have raised such capacity even fur-
ther, producing the state-of-the-art of mobile telecommunication technology.
While LTE is expected to support the needs of mobile telecommunications
for many years to come, 5G will extend the support of devices over mobile
telecommunications by building entirely new infrastructures consisting of
heterogeneous technologies.
This section introduces the reader to expectations, use cases, and require-
ments for 5G, and is based on material presented in di erent publications
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that address the topic.
2.1 Expectations
The expectation of 5G goes beyond the traditional definitions of consumer
and operator as in today’s networks. According to the white paper pub-
lished by the Next Generation Mobile Networks Alliance (NGMN) 5G [1],
5G should support new value propositions and business models. For exam-
ple, operator third-party partners should be able to access and control 5G
services via application programming interfaces (API) that integrate well
to the 5G system. Third-party partners and over-the-top players might
address customers directly and o er services that are enriched by the op-
erator network, connected smart wearables with remote monitoring being
one example. It follows that security of telecommunications needs a care-
ful reconsideration in terms of attacker and trust models due to the new
involved parties. Moreover, the 5G network will have to be more flexible
than today’s networks. In fact, the 5G Infrastructure Public Private Part-
nerships (5G PPP) [2] envisions that 5G will be driven by software, in the
context of software defined technologies such as NFV and SDN, to achieve
the required design goals. Thus, the security of such software becomes of
primary importance for the success of 5G.
Although 5G is still emerging as a technology, there are numerous or-
ganizations that have begun their research into 5G. The European Union
has initiated 19 projects via the 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partner-
ship (5G PPP), furthermore, worldwide 5G research is ongoing both in Asia
and North America. The timeline for 5G – depicted in Figure 1 – suggests a
first commercial deployment in 2020. We observe that each organization has
specified di erent phases. The 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP)
expresses the phases by release numbers. ITU names its phases with the
expected contribution. 5G PPP foresees three phases:
• Phase 1 consists on specification of requirements;
• Phase 2 details research and optimization;
• Phase 3 is about experimentation and trials.
Although each organization assigns its own nomenclature for each phase,
the di erent phases tend to synchronize among the organizations. In par-
ticular, the development of 4G and 5G in 3GPP is expected to synchronize
with release 14 (R14) between 2016 and 2017 [2]. Still, some di erences
exist. However, to avoid that research in 5G takes very di erent directions
among the organizations, a multilateral memorandum of understanding for
“Global 5G Events” was recently signed between 5G organizations in Eu-
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rope, USA, Japan, South Korea and China1, which will hopefully ensure the
continued synchronization of 5G research.
Figure 1: 5G Timeline.
2.2 Use Cases
The new use cases for 5G introduce a set of novel requirements and cover
a wide range of devices beyond smartphones. As discussed later, this also
leads to the need of a new security architecture capable to support such
requirements. Below, we introduce some novel use cases for mobile telecom-
munications. Our choice is corroborated by other research in the field [1,2,3].
2.2.1 Use case I: Internet of Things
The number of Internet-connected devices is expected to increase substan-
tially, thus introducing a wide set of novel requirements and characteris-
tics [1]. The collection of devices (or “things”) – embedded with elec-
tronics, software, sensors and network connectivity – is called Internet of
Things(IoT) [4]. Smart wearables, sensor networks, and mobile video surveil-
lance are examples of IoT devices.
5G is expected to fully support the connectivity of IoT. According to
the NGMN 5G white paper [1], this use case is described as “support for
massive IoT supportability”. In the context of 5G use cases, IoT devices are
characterized by
1. low-energy;
2. low-cost;
3. massive deployments (that are to be supported by the 5G network),
both as an overall aggregate and within the same cell.
1Leading 5G Visionary Organizations in Europe, USA, Japan, South Korea and China
Sign Multi-Lateral Memorandum of Understanding for “Global 5G Events”,
https://5g-ppp.eu/
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Due to its increased breadth and depth over existing network connectivity,
IoT poses novel security challenges, such as authorization of SIMless as well
as resource constraint devices. As 5G aims to be the network for excellence
for IoT, it must provide an adequate level of security and reliability.
2.2.2 Use case II: eHealth
The term eHealth denotes the practice of supporting healthcare by electronic
processes and communication. eHealth systems provide a win-win scenario
for both patient and healthcare provider, because it allows the patients to
remotely manage more of their own health care, and when necessary get
remote assistance from healthcare professionals, something which may also
reduce the costs for the provider.
To fulfill the high level of availability and guaranteed quality of service
(QoS) required, as well as appropriate security levels to protect user privacy
and confidentiality, eHealth demands ultra-reliable networks. Likewise, se-
curity requirements are amplified when sensitive personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) are exposed to public networks, such as the Internet. Meeting
basic integrity, confidentiality, and privacy requirements is therefore neces-
sary in order to ensure the trustworthiness of any eHealth service. According
to a survey conducted by The Economist [5], 42% of the respondents in the
public sector see the need to ensure patient privacy as the biggest challenge
for letting the health industry adopt mobile health technologies.
The role of 5G security is clear. It has to contribute security to foster
users’ confidence on adoption of mobile health technologies.
2.2.3 Use case III: Safety-critical systems
Safety is an emergent property in computer systems, and connected devices
are often placed in control situations within safety-critical systems. The
area of safety-critical systems is an emerging market that demands reliable
communications. The automotive sector is expected to be an important
stakeholder for 5G communication, and the Mobile and wireless communi-
cations Enablers for the Twenty-twenty Information Society (METIS), an
EU-funded project, have presented use cases for tra c safety, which include
cars detecting safety critical situations — such as hazardous road conditions
and accidents within reach of the car [6].
Safety-critical systems pose important challenges for 5G as their (se-
curity) failure could result in loss of life, significant property damage, or
environmental damage.
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2.3 Requirements
The use cases presented in [1, 2, 3, 7, 8] – in addition to the ones outlined
above – will introduce a new set of requirements, beyond the traditional
high bandwidth and low latency requirements. The METIS project [6] de-
livered scenarios, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and corresponding
requirements for 5G mobile and wireless systems. It introduces five scenar-
ios based on five challenges, presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Scenarios and challenges for 5G mobile and wireless systems.
Scenarios Challenges
Amazingly fast Very high data rate
Great service in a crowd Very dense crowds of users
Ubiquituous devices
communicating
Very low energy, cost, and a massive number
of devices
Best experience follows you Mobility
Real-time and reliable
communications
Very low latency
Based on these scenarios they present 12 test cases with corresponding
KPIs:
• Tra c volume density;
• Experienced user throughput;
• Latency;
• Reliability;
• Availability and retainability;
• Energy consumption;
• Cost.
The METIS project additionally specify several KPIs that 5G is expected
to support. Among others, they present:
• 500Mbit/s average user data rate;
• Density of up to 900Gbps/km2;
• Mobility of 500km/h;
• Latency less than 5ms in 99.999% of the transmissions;
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• 0.01µJ/bit for a data rate in the order of 1kbps.
Similar requirements are presented by the NGNM Alliance [1]. Surpris-
ingly, none of the KPIs directly target security, despite mentioning industries
that are strongly associated with security guarantees, e.g. healthcare and
eHealth.
3 5G Technology enhancements and technology
enablers
To meet the use-cases and requirements mentioned above, 5G will have to
evolve in several key technologies, in addition to the radio access technology
(RAT). Below, we focus on selected technology advancements presented by
telecommunication manufacturers to foster the evolution of 5G.
3.1 Radio network
5G vendors and operators suggest to support 5G with a new RAT that will
evolve in parallel with current LTE technologies, including parallel work
items in 3GPP radio access network (RAN) working groups [7,8]. Flexibility
and the possibility to further evolve the RAT with later technology introduc-
tions are seen as a prerequisite in the development of the 5G RAT [7]. We
present a summary of the proposed requirements of radio network capacity
in Table 2.
Table 2: Proposed requirements for radio network capacity
Peak data rate 10
GB/s
Number of
devices
1M/km2
Latency
5ms
Mobility Ø500
km/h
Mobile data
volume 10
Tb/s/km2
IoT terminals
Ø 1 trillion
Reliability
99.999%
Outdoor location
accuracy Æ 1m
3.1.1 Radio technology
Companies and organizations within 3GPP have reached a consensus that
5G will need to utilize new frequencies, including a spectrum up to 100Ghz,
to support the high capacity and low latency use cases. On a high level, the
spectrum is intended to be utilized as follows:
• In the frequencies below 6GHz, macro and small cells will provide
“low” band 5G, coexisting with current technologies (2-3G, LTE (4G)).
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• In the “high” band, i.e. frequencies above 6GHz, small cells will be
used to support very high data rates and short-range connectivity to
enable the ultra-dense network scenario.
The low spectrum is essential for economical delivery of mobile services,
hence the availability of low spectrum bands is a priority, in addition to
increasing the e ciency below 1GHz [1].
In mobile telecommunication architecture, the di erent types of tra c
are normally grouped in planes. The management plane is used for managing
the network itself, the control plane (C-Plane) carries signaling tra c, while
the user plane (U-plane) carries the network user tra c. In this section we
focus on the C-plane and U-plane. While the di erence is conceptual, each
plane is often implemented in overlay networks that are independent of each
other. To optimize the use of the di erent frequencies -– due to their di erent
properties -– a more convenient split of control plane and user plane should
be evaluated, considering di erent upload and download paths. The split of
the planes would imply multi-site connectivity from a single user equipment
(UE), decoupling system information delivery and data functionality from
di erent nodes [7].
Along with a new spectrum, a new modulation for 5G RAT should be
considered [7, 8]. Some vendors consider the Orthogonal frequency-division
multiplexing (OFDM) as the best modulation technology for mobile broad-
band [8]. It is currently used in LTE networks and was chosen due to its
robustness to multi-path fading, interference, and suitability to digital sig-
nal processing techniques. In addition to OFDM, Resource spread multiple
access (RSMA) waveforms might be considered as an enabler for low-power
IoT devices in 5G networks, considering its advantages for uplink short data
bursts [8]. Moreover, 5G RAT is expected to support both dynamic time di-
vision duplex (TDD) and frequency divided duplex (FDD) to enable future
unified spectrum utilization [7].
Another challenge for 5G is improving the signal-to-interference and
noise ratio (SINR). LTE introduced multiple input multiple output (MIMO)
antenna technology – albeit with a limited number of antennas. Further
technology enhancements, i.e. massive MIMO, are seen as one of the pos-
sible solutions. MIMO is especially relevant for higher frequency bands,
with properties that can increase the capacity and lower energy consump-
tion and interference. These properties will also favor the operators network
planning [9]. To fulfill both capacity and coverage needs in 5G, there are
proposals to shift to a “Beam-centric NX design”, i.e. the UE will be mobile
between beams rather than between nodes [7].
From a security point of view, there has been some criticism that LTE
is vulnerable to simple jamming techniques. One of the weaknesses concern
control instructions, which is only 1 percent of the total signal, but is vital
for synchronization, needed to send or receive data [10].
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Lastly, the 5G vision for network transmissions calls for a flexible and
ultra-light design, exposed in [7]. In fact, several design principles con-
cern the limitation of mandatory network transmissions, use of well-confined
transmissions in time and frequency, and avoidance of strict timing relations.
In a nutshell, data capacity must be able to scale independently of system
overhead.
3.1.2 Small cells
Current macro cells are not considered su cient to support the high band-
width and massive number of devices in the ultra-dense deployments ex-
pected in 5G [2], therefore 5G will need a larger deployment of small cell
technology. This results in additional requirements concerning automated
network organization, e.g. self-configuration, automatic neighbor relation
and self-healing mechanisms [3]. As uplink and downlink connectivity might
be split in 5G, tra c asymmetry will increase, hence tra c management will
need additional requirements as well as tra c assignment between RANs.
3.1.3 Supporting technologies
While there are several projects and publications regarding the radio tech-
nology for 5G, there is less research in the area of supporting technolo-
gies. Supporting technologies is a technology concept to further enhance the
network capacity by the introduction of new technologies, such as caching
or opportunistic communication. The literature only discusses supporting
technologies in general, still concluding that enhanced RAT and small cell
deployment will be insu cient to support the proposed use cases for 5G.
One of the possible techniques proposed to o oad the network is the
opportunistic device-to-device communications (D2D), [1,3], which is being
researched by the MOTO project2.
3.2 Core network
The heterogeneous use cases and bandwidth expectations of 5G must be
supported also by the core network (CN) and backhaul, to not restrict the
capacity o ered by the RAN to users. The CN must also embrace a more
open network architecture to support new business cases and values by third-
party services, as mentioned above, in addition to enhanced bandwidth and
latency. In the section below we present select technologies as enablers for
these requirements.
2FP7 MOTO Project Website: http://www.fp7-moto.eu
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Figure 2: MOTO o oading techniques.
3.3 Trends and new business values
5G is expected to continue a trend started already with the introduction
of LTE. LTE has converged to a less complex all IP-based network and a
flatter architecture. In LTE, the user-plane consists of only two networks
elements: the Evolved Node B (eNodeB) and the serving gateway (S-GW),
while the circuit-switched (CS) domain disappeared in favor of Voice over
LTE (VoLTE). The eNodeB is a hardware connected to the mobile phone
network, and communicates directly with the UEs. The S-GW transports
the IP data tra c between the UE and the external networks, hence it deals
with the user plane.
There are five major trends that the backhaul for 5G is expected to fol-
low: open network architecture, end-to-end quality of service (QoS) and se-
curity, significantly higher data rates, reduced latency, and network-assisted
synchronization [3]. An open network architecture is seen as a set of net-
works that are shared among operators. Virtualization will enable virtual
sub-networks with network resources dynamically allocated among the oper-
ators, and neutral brokers that manage the distribution of resources that are
priced according to o er and demand [3]. New use cases would make end-
to-end QoS an essential enabler, suggesting that the RAN must actively
verify the supported capacity in the backhaul via signaling and real-time
QoS measurements to deliver guaranteed capacity [3].
Synchronization helps to mitigate inter-cell interference, thus increasing
the spectral e ciency. To enable both indoor and outdoor installations,
operators prefer network-assisted synchronization, a technology in which the
backhaul assists with synchronization, over GPS synchronization. Network-
assisted synchronization is currently based on two main approaches, IEEE
1588v2 precision time protocol (PTP) and Synchronous Ethernet, using the
bit clock [11].
Related to capacity requirements, fog computing [12] is a technology
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trend that is mentioned in the 5G PPP vision [2]. Fog computing is an
architecture to move functionality, e.g. storage or communication config-
uration, closer to the edge of the network. It is seen as one of the key
technological components to meet the performance targets.
The proposals mentioned aim to support new business cases and value
creation for 5G. Thus, the 5G network will require flexibility and “as a
service” approach in its design principles [2].
3.3.1 Plane changes (C/U) and slices
So far the CN has been seen as a monolithic design optimized for mobile
broadband; instead, it needs to be rethought as a new infrastructure of
heterogeneous technologies according to NGNM [1]. As anticipated in Sec-
tion 3.1.1 – and suggested in the 3GPP RAN 3 meeting – the control plane
and user plane functions should be conveniently split to allow employing
their functions on demand.
To support new models and flexible designs, the authors of [1] propose
“5G Slice”, a network slicing technique to support the new use cases pre-
sented for 5G. Each slice consists of a number of network functions and
RAT settings to support the specific use cases and business models of net-
work service providers. A slice covers all parts of the network: software
modules running on cloud nodes, configurations of the transport network,
radio configuration, and the configuration of the 5G device itself. The goal
of creating network slices is to provide exclusively the requested functional-
ity. The request for a specific configuration is enabled by API calls to the
5G network.
3.4 Driven by software
The mobile telecommunication networks are already evolving towards an
open architecture based on standard operating systems and hardware and
is expected to continue towards a situation when “5G will be driven by
software” [2]. Emerging technologies – such as SDN, NFV, mobile edge
computing (MEC), and fog computing – are seen as enablers to achieve
the performance and scalability goals. Work on NFV and SDN began in
the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) in 2012. At
the SA#63 plenary 3GPP SA5 in March 2014, 3GPP began their work on
defining NFV and SDN functionality in upcoming releases.
As mentioned above, the CN will be built as an open architecture with
the ability for third-party organizations to request services directly from
the network and to obtain QoS guarantees. SDN and NFV are expected to
improve the flexibility of CN functions and of the allocation of resources.
3RAN 5G Workshop – “The Start of Something” : http://www.3gpp.org/
news-events/3gpp-news/1734-ran_5g
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Along with multiple virtualized components of the CN, many network parts
will continue to run on dedicated, specialized hardware for performance
reasons. Such hardware components should also be included in the SDN
model, to allow the programmability of the C-plane [1].
Adoption of the SDN model for mobile networks leverages a series of ad-
vantages, namely: improved inter-cell interference management, improved
mobility management, flexible support of virtual operators by partitioning
flow space, distributed anchoring, and local break-out support and optimiza-
tion of energy consumption.
NFV is complementary to SDN and has been enabled by advances in vir-
tualization technology and hardware support for network processing, which
allows to e ciently process network packages on commodity platforms. By
implementing essential network functionalities – such as QoS monitoring,
intrusion detection, firewalls, tra c shaping, etc. – in software applications
on commodity platforms, NFV allows middleboxes to be removed from the
network infrastructure.
Due to performance considerations, it would be naive to expect NFV to
completely replace middleboxes from the network functionality. Rather, the
two models coexist to better support the functionality of the network infras-
tructure. This is made possible, to a large extent, due to the abstractions
introduced by network virtualization and the scalability of the management
routines in the SDN model. Thus, identical configuration commands can be
applied to all network management applications regardless of their deploy-
ment model – hardware, native, or virtualized.
NFV is currently in an earlier development stage than SDN, partly due to
the lack of consensus over a so-called “Northern API”, i.e. the API between
the network controller and network management functions. While there is a
clean separation between control and data planes, the division between the
functionality of the network controller and management applications is less
clear. Thus, in many cases the applications are themselves a constituent
part of the network controller.
We expect that the features of the SDN and NVF models will play an
important role in the evolution of the next generation mobile telecommu-
nication networks, by enabling new scenarios, such as support for the IoT
devices, transient mobile network operators, and seamless integration with
other enterprise networks. We describe the general architecture of SDN in
more detail in Section 4.
3.5 Design principles for 5G
Table 3 summarizes the general design principles that we have presented
in this section. The design principles are based upon the visions presented
in [1, 2, 3, 7, 8].
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Table 3: Summary of Design Goal Principles
Radio Technology Network System
Architecture
New Values
Higher frequencies
>6Ghz
Minimize number
of entities and
functionalities
Advanced
Automation
Open
interfaces –
API
Unlicenced spectrum C/U-function split Built with
modern OS
architecture
Enable
anything-as-a-
service
(XaaS)
Multiple connectivity On-demand
user-plane
functions
Openness Enhanced
security
OFDM Modulation RAT-agnostic core NFV and SDN
principles
Massive MIMO /
CoMP
Minimize Legacy Network
slicing
Limitations of
mangatory
transmissions
Convergence
between fixed and
mobile services
Shared
networks
between
operators
Data capacity scaling
independent of system
overhead
Small cell radio nodes
(femto, micro, pico
cells)
Device to device
communications
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4 Software Defined Networking Overview
The software-defined networking (SDN) model emerged and rapidly evolved
in response to the increasing complexity of network deployments, allows
facilitating operation and management of cloud-grade networks [13,14]. The
operational advantages of the SDN model have led to its increasing adoption
in enterprise-grade network deployments on a global scale [15].
A conceptual model of the SDN architecture is depicted in Figure 3 and
described below based on the SDN architectural model presented in [16].
• The data plane contains both hardware and software routing equip-
ment. This component implements the routing policies that fulfill the
network administrator goals. It lacks decision logic and is optimized
for forwarding speed. Packets that do not match any policy are either
discarded or communicated to the control plane through the South-
bound API.
• Southbound API is a vendor-agnostic set of instructions implemented
by the routing equipment on the data plane. It allows bi-directional
communication between the data and the control planes.
• Control plane is a logically distributed abstraction layer that trans-
forms high-level network operator goals into discrete routing policies
based on a global network view. It contains a distributed network op-
erating system, which builds and maintains the global network view as
well as communicates with the equipment on the data plane. The con-
trol plane also includes the network hypervisor, which multiplexes the
available network resources among multiple users with distinct virtual
network topologies.
• Management applications are used by network administrators to ex-
press their network configuration goals using a set of high-level com-
ments. They could also include software-based network management
components such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, tra c shapers,
etc.
In the process of operating the SDN deployment, the logically central-
ized control plane constructs a global view of the network components in
its domain. This allows network management programs to rely on simpler
graph processing algorithms to compute the shortest paths and to operate
with higher-level abstractions, network operation is steered through network
policies from three sources:
• High-level goals expressed by the network administrator and compiled
into low-level configuration instructions for data-plane devices.
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Global network view
Traffic
shaper
Network Management Applications
Data Plane
Control Plane
Southbound API (e.g. OpenFlow)
Network Hypervisor
Network Operating System
(e.g. NOX, Rosemary, Floodlight, etc.)
Virtual
Firewall
Intrusion
Detection
System
Figure 3: High Level Architecture of the SDN Model.
• Network management applications implemented as software compo-
nents under the umbrella term network function virtualization (NFV)
– which issue policies to implement their network functionality, e.g.
as firewalls, tra c shapers, load balancers, intrusion detection devices
and other functionality traditionally implemented in network middle-
boxes.
• Network operating systems [17,18], which may independently generate
network policies in order to ensure network liveness properties in the
face of unexpected events (e.g. severe tra c anomalies or a DDoS
attack on a subset of network components).
The continuous stream of policies from the sources described above –
implemented by the network controller in a centralized manner throughout
the deployment – leads to a continuous evolution of the network state. This
introduces a new type of network configuration problems, since such net-
work policies may have competing or conflicting e ects on the data routing.
In a security context, such network policy conflicts can lead to data leaks
and isolation breaches in multi-tenant SDN environments. Thus, new al-
gorithms are required for both static and run-time verification of network
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configuration against policy invariants.
4.1 Software-Defined Networking in Mobile Networks
The Software-Defined Networking architectural model has so far received
significant attention in the cloud computing context. This allowed to both
evaluate its performance and evolve it according to the needs of both infras-
tructure and network service providers. Having been tested in large-scale
enterprise deployments, the SDN model also applies to mobile telecommuni-
cation networks. Besides the generic advantages of SDN – such as improved
ability to be managed, easier patching, flexible support of middleboxes –
some additional aspects are specific for mobile networks [13], namely:
• Better inter-cell interference management – Centralized processing, in-
herent to the SDN model, allows implementing e cient radio resource
management algorithms, in order to address the complex interference
scenarios created by multi-cell interference. Furthermore, centralized
processing allows – through inter-cell interference coordination – to
improve performance by avoiding, canceling, or exploiting interference
between adjacent cells. Finally, at the network level, centralized pro-
cessing allows adding spectrum resources and configure the network
to fine-tune user data tra c delivery, though orchestration and opti-
mization of ultra-dense networks.
• Improved mobility management: An increase in the density of networks
causes more frequent handovers due to the cell size. Thus, mobility
management decisions become an important fact in mobility manage-
ment, alongside with radio quality. Applying the SDN model can in
this case shorten service disruption time and reduce switching costs,
as well as enable e ective load balancing.
• Flexible support of virtual operators by partitioning flow space – sup-
port for multi-tenant virtualized networks allows allocating, providing
and enforcing network slice quotas according to the SLA agreed upon
between the infrastructure providers and infrastructure tenants, i.e.
network operators. Quota enforcement and e cient tenant isolation
are key enablers of this use case and must be reliably implemented
by a network hypervisor, or a similar component on the infrastructure
control plane.
• Distributed anchoring and local break-out support: The centralized
3GPP network architectures create high tra c demands in the CN
of network operators. Functionality supported by the SDN model can
help mitigate this by distributing the user data plane, in order to allow
local o oading of user data tra c. The decoupling between control
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and data plane allows in this case to maintain a logically centralized
control place in order to enable globally optimized operation.
• Energy optimization: The global network view enabled by the SDN
model allows the CN to optimize energy use by switching o  parts
of the RAN and backhaul – in order to reduce energy consumption –
depending on user demand and network status.
Along with the rapid evolution of the state-of-the-art in network policy
verification and enforcement for SDN deployments, as well as rapid progress
towards mature and secure SDN controllers, a range of challenging prob-
lems and gaps continue to persist. Examples of such challenges are verifying
liveness network properties (currently ignored in favor or safety properties),
verifying policy composition for out-of-order rule installations, developing a
model for non-interference among co-resident applications, as well as creat-
ing a sandboxing model for NFV applications interacting with the network
operating system.
Similarly, a range of security risks – characteristic to SDN deployments
– have been identified, such as vulnerabilities in the control plane, attacks
in control plane communications, lack of a trust chain between the manage-
ment applications and the data plane, attacks on policies and rules in pro-
grammable networks, resource limit violations, attacks on virtual switches
and network gateways as well weak bandwidth isolation as attack vehicle.
We further expand on the above security risks in Section 5.3.
5 Security
Security has been an important part of the earlier success of mobile telecom-
munication – the public trust has been steadfast since the introduction of
GSM to current LTE Advanced. One important aspect is that the security
features have been transparent to the user and have been unobtrusive in its
design, even between major versions, i.e. GSM to LTE.
As new versions have been released, new security functionality has been
added to support both new business- and use-cases, and to mitigate identi-
fied weaknesses and attacks by enhancing the security protocols and secu-
rity architecture. As this also applies to 5G, the security architecture and
security protocols must be developed to support the novel use-cases and
requirements expected in 5G.
In this section we begin with a historical review of the evolution of the
authentication and key agreement protocol (AKA). This is one of the fun-
damental security protocols in mobile telecommunications and acts as a
bootstrap protocol for communication. We describe the expanded use of
confidentiality and integrity protection in each release to show how the AKA
protocol has evolved to mitigate threats and known weaknesses. The section
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continues with a presentation of select security weaknesses and attacks that
have been exposed in UMTS and LTE. We conclude with a description of
a proposed security architecture for 5G and the security aspects of SDN,
expected to be prerequisite to enable the new business- and use-cases in 5G.
5.1 Background and evolution of GSM-LTE
Mobile telecommunication protocols have evolved with each new 3GPP re-
lease. The major releases, i.e. GSM to 3G to 4G/LTE, often receive the
most attention with regard to higher bandwidth and lower latency, whereas
the improved security mechanisms – though significant – are rarely men-
tioned. It is worth noting that the AKA security protocol was largely a
success, and even though vulnerabilities have been identified, AKA is one
of the most used security protocols in the world. In this section we review
the historical development of the AKA protocol used in global system for
mobile telecommunications (GSM), 3G and LTE, and its endpoint in the
core network.
5.1.1 GSM
The requirement for GSM (2G) was to provide security on par with wired
communications without loss of usability [19]. GSM moved to digital signal-
ing from the analogue signals used in 1G, and brought new tools to increase
security, such as cryptographic methods to protect the communication via
authentication and confidentiality controls.
In a nutshell, the first version of the AKA protocol works as follows.
The Mobile Station (MS) and the Authentication Centre (AuC) of the sub-
scriber’s home network share a longterm secret key Ki4 for each user i, stored
in the AuC and the subscriber identity module (SIM) card. Authentication
is performed by challenging the MS to perform a computation that is only
possible with access to Ki; authentication is successful provided the response
is identical to the expected response, retrieved from the subscribers home
network.
During the authentication process, a secret key KC is established and
used to confidentiality protect the communication between the MS and base
station. Additionally, to improve user privacy, a temporary mobile sub-
scriber identity (TMSI) is assigned to the MS as part of the initial signaling,
to reduce the need to send the permanent international mobile subscriber
identity (IMSI).
The design goal of the first version of the AKA protocol (GSM AKA)
was to authenticate the mobile station and to provide session keys to con-
fidentiality protect the wireless communications between the mobile station
4From UMTS and onward, the secret key was renamed to K, but to enhance readability
we use Ki throughout the paper.
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and base station. The GSM AKA procedure is described in Figure 4. Since
the introduction of GSM, known weaknesses in the GSM AKA protocol
have emerged into serious threats. One of the most discussed weaknesses
is the fact that GSM AKA only provides a one-way authentication of the
MS, and since there is no functionality for the MS to verify the base sta-
tion transceiver (BTS), the protocol is vulnerable to false BTS attacks. A
false BTS attack can enable an adversary to control all tra c passed via
the air interface between the MS and BTS, i.e. Man-in-the-middle attack
(MITM). The GSM AKA protocol also allowed an adversary to perform
replay attacks by misusing previously exchanged messages. At the time of
GSM AKA inception, it was considered too di cult for adversaries to build
devices capable of transmitting GSM messages, hence no mitigations for ac-
tive attacks - such as the attacks mentioned above - were included in the
protocol. Additionally, as the security architecture was focused to make it
on par with security on wired communications, which meant securing the
air interface. That also meant that sensitive data, such as KC, was sent
without protection within the networks – between the base stations, as well
as between base station controllers and other nodes in the network. An-
other weakness is created by short ciphering keys, which made the protocol
vulnerable for exhaustive search attacks with present computation capacity.
The fact that the cryptographic algorithms used in the protocol were kept
secret also started a public debate regarding its security.
GSM AKA detailed protocol description
Below is a detailed description of the GSM AKA protocol.
Authentication.
1. The AKA protocol is initialized by an “Authentication data request”
from the MS, that includes the identity of the subscriber and the
device capabilities, e.g. encryption algorithm support, that is sent to
the Visitor Location Registry (VLR) (for the circuit-switched domain)
or the serving GPRS support node (SGSN) (for the packet-switched
domain). The VLR/SGSN hold a database of the subscribers that
have roamed into its jurisdiction.
2. VLR or SGSN, depending on domain, prepares the challenge by ac-
quiring authentication triplets from the AuC.
3. AuC, which holds the copy of the permanent secret for the specific
IMSI, prepares the reply via the cryptographic functions A3 and A8
4. AuC responds with one or more authentication triplets consisting of a
random number (RAND), a signed response (SRES), and the secret
key KC to be used for confidentiality protection.
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5. VLR/SGSN initiates the authentication of MS by sending the RAND,
received from the AuC.
6. Upon receiving the challenge the MS prepares its SRES* by using
the same cryptographic functions as the AuC, namely A3, and also
produce the secret key KC via A8.
7. MS sends the response SRES* to the VLR/SGSN
8. VLR/SGSN compares SRES* from the MS with SRES from the AuC;
if SRES* and SRES match, then MS is authenticated – concluding the
authentication mechanism.
Encryption
9. VLR/SGSN sends KC to the base station transceiver (BTS), which is
the network endpoint for encryption in GSM.
10. BTS prepares the encryption by selecting a cryptographic algorithm.
11. BTS informs MS of the chosen algorithm; MS is also assigned a tem-
porary identity (TMSI), included in the response.
12. MS acknowledges the algorithm and TMSI with the Security mode
complete (SMComplete) message, concluding the encryption establish-
ment
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Figure 4: GSM AKA Procedure.
5.1.2 UMTS (3G)
UMTS maintained the principles introduced in the AKA protocol, however,
the protocol was significantly extended with integrity protection and func-
tions to prevent the possibility of replaying authentication messages. Replay
attacks are e ectively prevented by including a sequence number (SQN ) in
the challenge, and protecting the same challenge with a message authenti-
cation code (MAC). False base station attack are also prevented with these
changes to the AKA protocol, since UMTS AKA provide a mutual authen-
tication which authenticates both the user and network. To maintain the
public trust in UMTS, 3GPP decided to use publicly available cryptographic
algorithms, as the secrecy of GSM cryptographic algorithms has earlier cre-
ated controversial discussions. The cryptographic keys were extended to
128bits.
Similar to GSM AKA, the user equipment (UE) still authenticates with
the VLR or SGSN via a challenge-response protocol. As mentioned, UMTS
AKA includes enhancements compared to GSM, e.g. mutual authentication
between the network and the UE and integrity protection of select protocols.
The authentication vector is subsequently expanded with specific session
keys for integrity (IK) and confidentiality (CK), an authentication token
(AUTN ) to enable the UE to verify the network and a MAC for integrity
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protection. To mitigate replay attacks the AUTN contain a SQN. It is worth
noting that since the AUTN is computed by the users home network, there
is no possibility for the UE to authenticate the serving network (SN) in
case of a roaming user. Instead, there is an implicit trust that the serving
network is allowed by the UEs home network to provide mobile services, as
the serving network is being able to retrieve authentication vectors from the
home network. The UMTS AKA procedure is described in Figure 5.
In GSM, the circuit-switched confidentiality was terminated in the BTS,
denoted NodeB in UMTS, which meant that all tra c from the BTS to the
base station controller was sent unprotected, often via microwave link. To
mitigate this security weakness, the cryptographic functions were extended
to the serving radio network controller (SRNC) in UMTS, responsible for
controlling the base stations, i.e. NodeBs, that are connected to it, which
added integrity and confidentiality protection between the NodeB and core
network, in addition to the higher level of physical security of the RNC
compared to the base stations.
UMTS AKA detailed protocol description
Below is a detailed description of the UMTS AKA protocol.
Authentication.
1. The authentication and security mode setup is initialized by the con-
nection establishment from the UE to the SRNC. Similar to GSM, the
initial message includes the capabilities of the UE.
2. UE continues with the transmission of an “Initial L3 Message” to the
VLR/SGSN, which includes the IMSI and a key set identifier (KSI ).
The KSI enables the re-use of the CK and IK during subsequent con-
nections.
3. Similar to GSM AKA, the VLR/SGSN prepares the authentication
challenge by requesting authentication vectors from the AuC in the
home environment (HE).
4. AuC computes the authentication vector, which includes 128-bit in-
tegrity and confidentiality session keys, an AUTN to allow the UE
verify the network, a MAC for integrity protection, the RAND and
an expected response (XRES) that is similar to GSM. The AUTN
consists of a SQN, which is optionally XORed with an anonymity key
(AK ) to conceal the SQN, an authentication management field (AMF)
that can be used to control cryptographic functions and algorithms,
and the MAC, i.e. SQNüAK || AMF || MAC. The MAC is calculated
with the cryptographic function f1, as f1 (Ki, AMF, SQN, RAND).
5. AuC sends the generated vectors to the VLR/SGSN
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6. VLR/SGSN initiates the mutual authentication by sending the RAND
and AUTN to the UE.
7. The same algorithms used by the AuC are applied in the UE to gener-
ate the necessary output, e.g. session keys, SQN, RES, expected MAC
(XMAC ) etc. With the successful execution of the cryptographic func-
tions, the UE authenticates the network by validating that the MAC
received in the AUTN is identical to the XMAC. The UE also verifies
that the SQN is in the correct range, to prohibit replay attacks.
8. If the verifications succeed, the UE sends RES to the VLR/SGSN.
9. VLR/SGSN does a corresponding verification that the RES is identical
to XRES ; if true the mutual authentication is completed.
Encryption.
10. With identities of both the network and the UE verified, the VLR/SGSN
initiates integrity and confidentiality protection by sending the RANAP
message Security mode command to the SRNC, which is the termina-
tion point for the integrity and confidentiality protection in UMTS.
The security mode command includes the allowed cryptographic algo-
rithms for integrity and confidentiality protection and the associated
session keys CK and IK.
11. SRNC decides the cryptographic algorithms based on a preference list
from the VLR/SGSN and the capabilities sent by the UE in step 1.
It generates the random number FRESH, and computes the integrity
message MAC-I via a cryptographic function denoted f9. The input
for MAC-I is: the chosen algorithms; UE capabilities; the FRESH ; a
counter COUNT-I ; a direction bit to indicate if the message is intended
for uplink or downlink; the integrity key IK. By including the UE ca-
pabilities into MAC-I, a downgrade attack is e ectively mitigated and
the COUNT-I value protects against replay of earlier control messages.
12. SRNCs send the algorithms, UE capabilities, MAC-I and FRESH to
the UE in a security mode command.
13. In a similar verification to the mutual authentication, the UE will
compute its own XMAC-I and compare it with MAC-I to verify the
integrity of the message. The UE will also verify that the received
“UE Security Capabilities” are equal to the capabilities sent in step 1.
14. If verification is successful, the UE sends a “Security mode complete”
message together with a MAC-I to the SRNC.
15. SRNC verifies the MAC-I with its own generated XMAC-I.
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16. If the verification in step 15 succeed, the SRNC completes the security
mode setup by sending Security mode complete – including the selected
algorithms – to the VLR/SGSN.
Figure 5: UMTS AKA Procedure.
29
5.1.3 LTE (4G)
Considering the success of UMTS security, 3GPP endeavored to alter it
only where necessary to facilitate the new Evolved Packet System (EPS)
architecture and the security requirements brought by changing business
models or deployment requirements.
Thus, 3GPP continued the existing security association between the UE
and AuC in LTE. With each of the sides storing and protecting the per-
manent key and thus continuing with the principles of AKA, the resulting
protocols was denoted EPS-AKA. To prevent significant operator costs and
to ease the consumer transition from UMTS to LTE (by avoiding the need
to exchange their USIM), it was decided that LTE must support the UMTS
USIMs. Due to major disadvantages of GSM AKA compared to EPS-AKA,
the older GSM (2G) SIM cards were prohibited for LTE.
One of the design goals of LTE EPS was to flatten the architecture and
discontinue the use of intermediate nodes, which made the base station –
denoted as evolved Node B (abbreviated as eNodeB or eNB) in LTE net-
works – the termination point for many of the signaling protocols. This
design restarted the discussion of the security termination point. Terminat-
ing signaling protocols in the eNodeB implied that the protection of those
messages also terminated at the eNodeB. This is opposite to the decision
of UMTS workgroup, which moved the termination point to the RNC – lo-
cated deeper inside the UMTS network – to resolve the weakness of GSM.
To mitigate the fact that the eNodeB was seen as unsecured (since it is
placed in exposed locations), requirements were put in place to enhance the
physical and system security of the eNodeB. This was the first time that
3GPP included specific platform security requirements for a network node.
With these specifications in place, 3GPP accepted to terminate the security
protocols in the eNodeB.
One of the high-level security requirements described in [TS22.278] is
that a security lapse in one access technology must not compromise other
accesses. Two significant changes compared to UMTS support this require-
ment. LTE introduced a distinction between the non-access stratum layer
(NAS), handling tra c between the UE and core network, and the access
stratum (AS) for signaling tra c between the UE and eNodeB. Additionally,
LTE expanded the cryptographic key separation as a mechanism to limit the
e ect of a key leakage. In LTE a local master key, KASME , is derived from
the UMTS integrity and confidentiality keys together with the identity of the
serving network (SNid), which implies that the serving network is implicitly
authorized as the HN has used the correct SNid in its key calculation, which
is an improvement from UMTS. From the local master key KASME , specific
keys are derived to provide integrity and confidentiality protection for AS,
NAS and RRC signaling tra c. The LTE AKA procedure is described in
Figure 6.
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Another feature of LTE is the improved privacy protection of the user,
namely two specific changes in the handling of temporary identities as well
as the permanent terminal identity of International Mobile Equipment Iden-
tity (IMEI) and International Mobile Equipment Identity and Software Ver-
sion (IMEISV). To increase the privacy of the user, LTE has support for
confidentiality protection of the signaling messages that transmit the Glob-
ally Unique Temporary UE Identity (GUTI) identity to the UE. If used, it
prevents a passive adversary from correlating the GUTI identity with the
permanent IMSI. However, active attacks to retrieve the IMSI from the UE
are still possible. The second change is the required protection of the IMEI
and IMEISV terminal identities, which are perhaps even more permanent
than the IMSI since the user might switch operator more often than the
mobile equipment (ME), by requiring NAS signaling protection before they
are transmitted.
If we summarize the LTE advancements, the most significant changes
were in the network part, making the design flatter and entirely removing
the circuit switched domain. From a security perspective, the AKA protocol
received improvements, enabling the UE to identify the serving network and
the introduction of advanced key derivations.
LTE AKA detailed protocol description
Below is a detailed description of the LTE AKA protocol.
Authentication.
1. The authentication and security mode setup is initialized by the attach
request from the UE to the MME, which is a central part responsible
for paging, identity allocation, authentication among others in LTE.
2. The MME prepares the authentication challenge by requesting authen-
tication vectors from the home subscriber system (HSS) in the home
environment (HE) of the subscriber. The HSS contains user-related
and subscription-related information and includes functionality such
as u ser authentication and authorization, and is based on the home
location registry (HLR) and AuC from earlier 3GPP releases.
3. Upon receiving the acquisition request from the MME, the AuC part
of the HSS will compute an UMTS AV.
4. The HSS generates the extended authentication vectors, compared to
UMTS, which include the local master key, KASME , calculated as
KASME = KDF(CK, IK, SNid, SQNüAK).
5. The HSS sends the EPS authentication vector to the MME.
6. The MME initiates the mutual authentication by sending the RAND,
AUTN and a key set identifier (KSIASME) to the UE.
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7. The same algorithms used by the HSS is applied in the UE to generate
the necessary output, e.g. session keys, SQN, RES, XMAC, etc. The
same verifications as in UMTS is performed by the UE to authenticate
the network.
8. If the verifications are true, the UE send the RES to the MME.
9. The MME does a corresponding verification that the RES is identical
to XRES, if true the mutual authentication is completed and the MME
prepares the NAS security setup by deriving KNASENC and KNASINT
from KASME . The MME additionally produces non-access stratum
MAC (NAS-MAC ) used for integrity protection.
NAS Security setup.
10. The MME send the UE capabilities, NAS algorithms and the NAS-
MAC to the UE.
11. In a similar verification to the mutual authentication, the UE will
derive KNASENC and KNASINT from KASME and compute its own
XNAS-MAC and compare it with NAS-MAC to verify the integrity
of the message.
12. If verification is successful, the UE send an integrity and confidentiality
protected NAS “Security mode complete” to the MME, concluding the
NAS Security setup.
AS Security setup.
13. The MME derive a local eNodeB master key, KeNB , from KASME .
14. The MME send KeNB and the capabilities to the eNodeB.
15. The eNodeB derives cryptographic keys from the local eNodeB mas-
ter key, KeNB , to be used for encryption, KRRCENC , and integrity
protection, KRRCINT , of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling
protocol and user-plane encryption, KUPENC .
16. The eNodeB initiates the AS Security setup, which includes the AS
algorithms and AS-MAC.
17. The UE derives the AS session keys and the expected AS-MAC and
verify it with the AS-MAC.
18. If the verification is successful, the UE sends “Security mode complete”
together with a MAC to the MME, concluding the AS Security setup.
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Figure 6: EPS AKA Procedure.
5.2 Weaknesses in UMTS and LTE
In this section we review several publications that describe attacks on UMTS
and LTE networks.
5.2.1 Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (AKA)
As new releases of the 3GPP standard are developed, an important design
aspect is to include backward compatibility to the previous 3GPP release.
An example is the security architecture of the UMTS AKA protocol that
allows 2G SIM cards to authenticate to 3G networks. This is achieved by
expanding KC from a 64bit key to 256bit key via a conversion function. The
downside is the decreased security, since in the example above the key length
is considerable shorter. In addition to the key length, there is no mutual
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authentication of the network, since only one key, KC, can be produced per
authentication. This type of backward compatibility is exploited by several
attacks.
Meyer and Wetzel [20] use this design decision to mount a MITM attack
on the UMTS AKA protocol. The attack assumes that the adversary knows
the victim’s IMSI, which can easily be obtained by initiating an authenti-
cation procedure with the victim. With the IMSI known to the attacker,
the attack consists of two phases. In phase 1 the attacker acts on behalf of
the victim to retrieve a valid AUTN from the real UMTS network. This is
possible in UMTS since AUTN and RAND is sent without protection.
In phase 2, the attacker impersonates a valid GSM BS to the victim.
Once the victim establishes a connection, it sends its security capabilities
and TMSI, or IMSI, to the attacker. The attacker responds with the valid
AUTN and RAND retrieved in phase 1, which the victim successfully ver-
ifies. In the subsequent security method setup the attacker decides to use
“no encryption”, or a broken version of the GSM algorithms. This attack
succeeds if the time period between phase 1 and 2 is short so the SQN and
FRESH stays valid. The attack also requires that the victim’s phone, de-
noted mobile station (MS) in GSM, allows roaming to GSM networks. With
a successful attack the adversary is able to eavesdrop on all tra c between
the victim and the mobile network.
Several contributions ( [21, 22]) have focused on the fact that identities
are sent without confidentiality protection during the initial authentication.
Di erent proposals have been made to enhance the AKA protocol to provide
confidentiality protection to IMSI and the temporary identities, i.e. TMSI,
P-TMSI, GUTI and radio network temporary identities (RNTI).
The authors of [21] propose a new LTE protocol to protect the identi-
ties, such as IMSI and RNTI, from being transmitted without confidentiality
protection over the air interfaces during the connection process. The threat
model allows an attacker to track the victim using leaked identities, i.e.
IMSI, and a number of rogue eNodeBs. This threat model also claims the
possibility of LTE DoS attacks using the leaked identities. The authors pro-
pose a new protocol that includes a series of arithmetic operations together
with exchanged random numbers and Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)
ID to generate keys, that are then used to safely transmit identities in the
initial attach for UE in the ECM connection establishment.
Chengzhe et al. [22] propose a variant that addresses known weaknesses
in EPS-AKA and also adds new functionalities. The proposed protocol is
called SE-AKA: A secure and e cient group authentication and key agree-
ment protocol for LTE networks. Due to the importance of backward com-
patibility, EPS-AKA inherits some weaknesses of UMTS-AKA, which the
authors claim are addressed. SE-AKA introduce asymmetric key encryption
and Elliptic Curve Di e-Hellman (ECDH) which add properties of increased
user privacy and perfect forward secrecy, a known deficiency in the current
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EPS-AKA protocol. The protocol claims resistance to replay attacks, redi-
rection attacks, MITM attacks and DoS attacks. The paper includes a
formal verification of the security of the protocol by using ProVerif.
A lightweight public key infrastructure (PKI) is introduced in SE-AKA
to provide each group node (GN) with a private/public key pair. The au-
thors suggest to store the public key of HN in the trusted environment of
the USIM. The public key enables the ME to encrypt the IMSI and therefor
increase privacy properties of the protocol. Use of public key certificates
to provide better protection for identities during the EPS-AKA design has
been discussed within 3GPP; however, it was concluded that mandating a
PKI infrastructure between all operators would be too costly [23].
SE-AKA also introduced support for group authentication. The emer-
gence of machine-type communication has already begun with LTE and is
expected grow significantly, as mentioned in previous sections. To address
the risk of high network access latency when numerous devices in a group
need network access in a short timespan, SE-AKA introduce specific func-
tionality for group authentication.
The weaknesses in EPS-AKA, identified in the presented papers, were
often known already during the design of the protocols. In the published
paper from JK. Tsay, and SF. Mjølsnes [24] the authors present a vulnera-
bility in both the UMTS-AKA and EPS-AKA protocols. The vulnerability
exploits the fact that the SN has no means of associating an authentication
data response from the HN to a specific UE, since its content is protected
by the long term shared secret K that is not known to the SN. The authors
present a scenario where the attacker can impersonate the victim to get a
wireless service that will be billed to the victim by the HN. The attacker
only needs the IMSI of the victim to initiate the attack, the victim does not
need to be present on the network at the time. The attacker will initiate
two concurrent AKA sessions to the SN, by sending both her own IMSI, and
the IMSI’ of the victim. As described in sections above, the SN will retrieve
authentication vectors from the HN. During the subsequent execution of the
AKA protocol, the attacker redirects the messages in such a way that they
are interpreted by the SN to be intended for the victims IMSI’. The real
AKA session initiated for the victim’s IMSI’ is aborted, since the attacker
does not have access to the secret key of the victim.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the cryptographic protection in mobile
telecommunication is based on a long-term shared secret Ki stored in the
USIM of the user and the AuC of the network operator. If an adversary
can get access to the shared secrets, she will be able to decrypt all tra c
from the a ected USIMs users. There are indications that this scenario has
been exploited recently – a USIM vendor had a suspected breach of their
security giving the attacker(s) access to the shared secrets of their produced
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USIMs5. There are currently no mitigations available for this weakness – it
is an intrinsic problem with all systems based on shared secrets.
5.2.2 LTE Practical attacks
Shaik et al. [25] describe the first practical attacks on LTE in their paper.
The described persistent and silent attacks require user action – e.g. re-
booting the device or have the USIM reinserted – in order for recovery. The
authors describe 6 di erent attacks, 3 attacks which can lead to the exposure
of the location (D1, D2, D3) of the target, and another 3 attacks that can
cause persistent denial of service (L1, L2, L3). The protocols and signaling
used in the location leak attacks are:
• Handling of identities and temporary identities on LTE networks;
• The paging and smart paging mechanism;
• The broadcasts and the information that is transmitted in these;
• The measurement reports that an UE can send to the network.
Paging is the method used to locate a specific UE in a particular tracking
area (TA) to deliver a network service. A TA is a geographic area in a
LTE network, which contains a group of cells. When a specific UE needs
paging, the network broadcasts the page to the specific TA where the UE
is registered. Additionally, a new functionality was added in LTE, called
smart paging, that aims to reduce signaling overhead and to improve the
time to locate an UE. In smart paging, only the specific eNodeB where the
UE was last seen broadcasts the page. In the pages the UE is addressed by
its temporary identity, if available, otherwise the permanent IMSI identity
is used.
Shaik et al. have found a novel way to exploit these functions to locate
the UE [25]. In the first exploit, L1, they utilize the fact that operators use
the same GUTI identities for a significant time period, as long as the UE is
powered on. Even if the UE is moved inside a city, the GUTI remains the
same. Since the GUTI identity is persistent for several days it is possible
to follow the subscriber’s movements. This attack is entirely passive, the
attacker only needs to pick up the paging broadcasts.
The second attack, L2, is semi-passive. As mentioned in Section 5.1,
the circuit-switched domain was removed in LTE and voice tra c transi-
tioned to an IP-based solution, VoLTE. VoLTE has a high priority in LTE
and therefore a TA wide broadcast will be used to quickly find the UE. By
initiating a VoLTE call to the victim, long enough to cause a TA broadcast
5The Intercept: https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
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but short enough to not trigger a notification on the victim’s UE, the pres-
ence of a victim in a specific TA is found by observing the GUTI identities
being broadcasted. By applying a method proposed by Kune et al. [26],
the authors can identify the GUTI that is mapped to the phone number of
the victim. When the TA is identified where the UE is located, the authors
proceeded by using social networking applications to trigger a smart page.
The authors have used specific Facebook and WhatsApp features to issue a
smart page that do not lead to a notification on the UE. By using a smart
page the authors could narrow down the location to a specific cell (roughly
2km2 in an urban setting).
The third location attack, L3, is an active attack using rogue eNodeBs.
The attack is based on two di erent signaling methods, measurement report
and RLF reports. These reports will contain the signal power from neigh-
boring cells, and by using trilateration techniques the attacker can find the
location of the UE. Although not supported by many UE vendors, LTE also
has a function called ’locationInfo-r10’ which will include GPS coordinates
in the report, making the position even more exact. This measurement
report attack vector is possible due to measurements reports are excepted
from security requirements, i.e. sent in clear text without encryption and in-
tegrity verification. The protocols and signaling used in the denial of service
attacks are:
• Tracking area update (TAU) procedure used to inform the network of
the UE’s present TA;
• LTE attach procedure that is sent unprotected and hence can be used
for MITM attacks.
As with the vulnerability described in L3 above, the DoS attacks de-
scribed below are possible due to the lack of integrity protection of RRC
messages between the UE and eNodeB. The three vulnerabilities presented
by Shaik et al. is based on two EMM protocol messages. The first is the
TAU procedure used to update the MME of its current TA, and is used in
the presented attack D1 and D2. The second procedure is in the “Attach”
request which is used in the D3 attack. The attacks require the UE to
connect to the attacker’s rogue eNodeB.
In the first two attack scenarios presented by the authors, D1 and D2,
the victim UE sends an integrity protected TAU Request to the rogue eN-
odeB, to which the attacker responds with a TAU Reject message. The LTE
specification does not require encryption of these messages, hence it is pos-
sible by the attacker to send these to any of the UEs connected to the rogue
eNodeB. The reject message can either degrade the UE service to UMTS or
GSM, enabling further attacks, or deny all services to the UE. Regardless
if it is a downgrade attack to UMTS/GSM or if all services are denied, the
victims UE will stay in the new state until the UE is rebooted or if the
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USIM is reinserted, thereby the denial of service attack can be considered
persistent.
In the third denial of service attack, D3, the attackers perform a MITM
attack during the LTE attach procedure. The attacker intercepts the “At-
tach request” sent by the UE to the eNodeB and modifies the message with
the addition of “Additional update type – SMS only”, and forwards it to the
eNodeB. The MME processes this message on behalf of the UE and executes
the AKA procedure with the UE. The profile however only allows SMS and
data services, as the attacker has denied voice services. Incoming or outgo-
ing voice calls will be rejected by the MME. This attack is persistent until
the UE is rebooted, the USIM is reinserted of if the UE is moved to another
TA.
The authors in [25] present explanations and backgrounds as to why
these vulnerabilities exist in their security analysis, they summarize them
in three areas, security vs availability – security vs performance – security
versus functionality. In all DoS cases (D1,D2,D3) and the third location
leak, L3, 3GPP has documented the specification exception made from the
security working group. If we look at the decision behind L3, as one example,
the 3GPP security working group (SA3) suggested that all RRC protocol
message should be encrypted, but in this case the availability aspect was
considered more important than the privacy of the user. The reason behind
the design decision was supposedly to enable measurement reports from all
UEs, even if they are not able to establish a connection with the eNodeB and
hence not being able to activate the security context. The paper summarizes
it well in the sentence “We show that the equilibrium points in the trade-
o s have shifted today compared to where they were when the LTE security
architecture was being designed”.
5.2.3 Transition to open protocols and hardware
With the introduction of LTE a considerable architectural change was made
as the circuit-switched domain was removed in favor of an entirely packet-
switched IP-based architecture. Additionally, the telecom industry is moving
from a monolithic design to o -the-shelf hardware and operating systems,
such as Linux [21]. The protocols used in LTE has made a similar transition
to utilize more open protocols, such as session initialization protocol (SIP)
for VoLTE, Diameter for AAA, and domain name system (DNS) for the IP
multimedia subsystem (IMS).
The presentation [27] at the HITB conference 2013 suggest that this
transition will increase the attack vectors of LTE networks. VoLTE is based
on SIP but with injection of signaling system #7 (SS7) via ISUP. DNS
is used extensive in IMS, but without the required security it becomes an
open directory for the entire network, including the location of equipment
and identities of users, according to the author. Vulnerabilities and mis-
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configurations that are common in traditional IT infrastructures, e.g. OS
exploits, can now be used to attack LTE networks.
The presenter implies that instead of decreasing the complexity, by mov-
ing to a flatter design, IP-based infrastructure and the adoption of open
protocols that are “wider”, the complexity will double as all the traditional
protocols will still be required. SIGTRAN and SS7 will be tunneled via IMS
and Diameter. An example of the increased network attack surface in LTE is
the X2AP interface. In LTE, eNodeBs can address other eNodeBs directly,
compared to 3G where the BS was only connected to the RNC. This results
in a lower defense in depth security, if an attacker can gain access to one
eNodeB the attacker will have layer 2 access to the other eNodeBs.
5.3 Technology shift equals security shift
In this section we describe a proposed AAA security architecture for 5G and
how software defined networking and network virtualization functionality
can enable the use cases.
5.3.1 Security architecture
In the evolution of mobile telecommunication networks, security has never
been the main driver. That is not to say that the security has been at
a stand still, quite the contrary, security protocols have been significantly
enhanced from GSM 2G to LTE, as mentioned in previous sections. But
security has previously been bolted to new technology enhancements and
existing security mechanisms has been reapplied to new networks. For 5G
this is no longer an option [28].
According to [2], there is a key di erence with 5G in the targeted business
and service delivery models. New actors bring new security requirements
that needs to be handled as well as new types of interactions between actors.
5G PPP takes note that new services are expected to be deployed through
virtualization to lower costs and to increase agility. A telecom server is no
longer a special physical box with proprietary protocols that is located in a
physically secured location, which introduce new attack vectors [27,28].
To enable these new actors, services and business models 5G PPP call
for “drastically new trust models and a security architecture built from the
ground-up” [28].
The new trust model must take into account that, as has been known
from the recent leaks, cyber-attacks are a real threat, both from states and
individuals. Today’s trust model is based on a friendly environment between
operators and connected devices. The new actors also alters the concept of
“operators”: in 5G a car manufacturer might deploy 5G, hence the man-
ufacturer becomes a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO). The afore-
mentioned transition from dedicated telecommunication hardware to open
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platforms, or even infrastructure-as-service or platform-as-a-service cloud
service models, further reinforces the need for a new trust model. The exist-
ing trust models cover only parts of the 5G scenarios at best, additionally,
as a consequence from the recent leaks, security is currently seen as a pre-
requisite when launching new services today, not only in 5G
In November 2015 a dedicated security project, 5G-ENSURE6, was started
as part of 5G PPP. The project will include the development of a proposed
security architecture and security enablers in the areas AAA, Privacy, Trust,
Security Monitoring and Network Management & Virtualization isolation.
Existing AAA methods, e.g. EPS-AKA, must be adapted and be made
more flexible to support new use cases, models that are bound to single user
subscriptions must adapt to handle massive machine to machine (M2M) or
IoT units. Identity bearers cannot be expected to be hardware security
elements in all types of devices, car manufacturers present ’SIMless’ com-
munications as one of the use cases, trends and requirements in their pre-
sentation at the 3GPP RAN 5G workshop [29]. The challenge for 5G will be
to support the extensive AAA legacy framework and still be able to add the
required extensions by new business models and technology advancements.
In the 5G-ENSURE proposal [28], Figures 7 and 8 below are presented
as an overview of the target security architecture and AAA scenario for 5G.
The architecture in Figure 7 is based on ITU-T X.805. The foundation in
AAA is the secure identification of the services, end-points and users. As
mentioned above, 5G must support devices that lack a dedicated hardware
module, i.e. USIM, that holds the identity of the user. As described in
the 5G-ENSURE proposal [28] the existing binding between the USIM and
HLR as the primary method to handle credentials will be far too expensive
and inflexible when scaling up to massive number of devices expected in 5G.
5G-ENSURE will present new models, flexible and secure to add support
for SIMless devices and with a distributed approach for authentication to
support inter-operability. Additionally, the distributed approach might also
involve the bring-your-own-identity (BYOI) concept. In many cases, enter-
prises already have their existing AAA infrastructure in place for employees
and devices. In a BYOI configuration, these devices and users can re-use
their pre-existing identities, e.g. certificates issued to devices, as a basis for
5G access.
The need for new methods also expand into authorization. In exist-
ing mobile telecommunication networks the authorization methods are not
adapted to support resource constrained environments, both with regard
to computing and network resources. In 5G new models are needed that
provide granular access control decisions and are taken as close to the ap-
plication as possible.
The future protocols can be based on existing protocols, e.g. OAuth
65G-Ensure Project Website: http://5gensure.eu
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and OpenID Connect, that are integrated with the 5G authorization infras-
tructure. These models, protocols and interfaces need to be standardized to
prevent market fragmentation [28].
As stated in the proposal, accounting is mainly a business enabler, nev-
ertheless 5G-ENSURE will work with accounting as an important enabler
for 5G. In 5G, the user might take advantage of many kinds of services,
which emphasize the need for assurance to the user regarding the cost of
these services, and the resource usage. Conversely, the operators do not
want the users to dispute the cost of the used services. Thus, new business
models and new business actors require new secure and assured accounting
principles, including non-repudiation properties.
In Figure 7, the model is showing both the logical and functional format.
The functional dimension is represented by the yellow and blue boxes. The
blue boxes illustrate the required security capabilities, while the yellow boxes
represent enablers in each capability area. Together they comprise the func-
tional security services for Data Security – Authentication – Authorization
– Availability – Trust and Security monitoring and Privacy.
Figure 7: Proposed security architecture for 5G.
The logical dimension is shown by the horizontal boxes and illustrates
the layering of the 5G network into planes, and the “slicing” of planes for
tenants and providers.
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Figure 8: Proposed AAA architecture for 5G.
5.3.2 Software-defined networking
As mentioned earlier, SDN is expected to be a prerequisite for enabling the
use cases of 5G. The SDN architectural approach challenges many of the
network infrastructure rules and best practices that have evolved over the
decades since packet-switched digital network communication gained pop-
ularity and to a large extent replaced circuit-switched networks. Likewise,
many security best practices accumulated over the years are becoming in-
creasingly obsolete and must be adapted to the new architectural model in
order to adjust to the newly emerging risk factors and threat vectors.
One such risk factor is the centralized, global view of the network com-
ponents (collectively called the network edge) and the links between them
maintained by the network controller. Such functionality introduces mul-
tiple new capabilities for improved network management – anything from
pre-calculating optimized tra c routing to software applications replacing
hardware middleboxes. However, it also introduces a single point of failure –
the network controller – which operates on a global network view built from
on its recurrent communication with the SDN-enabled network components.
Once compromised, the controller can provide the attacker with complete
control over the entire network. An attacker capable of impersonating net-
work components can thus distort the controller’s global network view and
influence the network-wide routing policies.
Another potential risk factor is the proliferation of virtualized network
components (such as routers and switches) running on full-fledged commod-
ity OS, often assigned the same trust level and privileges as specialized,
hardware network components with compact embedded software [30]. Con-
sidering that commodity OS with large code bases are likely to contain
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multiple exploitable security flaws, such components can be attacked and
modified to not follow the protocol, reroute tra c to a malicious destina-
tion or hijack other network edge components through lateral attacks.
Below we present an enumeration of the attack vectors applicable to
the SDN model, based on [31]. Each of the presented attack vectors is
accompanied by requirements that – if implemented – would help mitigate
the risk introduced by the attack vectors. The full analysis can be found
in [31].
Vulnerabilities in the control plane
Along with ease of network administration, a central control plane in-
troduces a primary attack target for an adversary motivated to take control
of the network. Taking over the control plane component in the SDN archi-
tecture allows the adversary to obtain full control of the network communi-
cation, di erent from traditional networks where communication control is
distributed throughout various network components. Possible solutions in-
clude splitting the controller into several domains or distributing the control
plane over several hosts, such that issued policies are verified on a di erent
component before deployment.
• The SDN control plane must implement an access control model which
limits the e ects that vulnerabilities in controllers can have on tenant
domains. This can prevent an adversary from simultaneously gaining
control over the functionality of the SDN controller at all privilege
levels and in all roles.
• A dedicated entity must verify the policies to be implemented by the
SDN control plane before deployment.
Attacks on control plane communications
To manipulate network policies, the adversary may attempt to spoof
the control plane communication (both among the components of a dis-
tributed controller and between management applications, controller and
data plane). Similar attacks have been discussed in the context of mobile
communication networks, where nodes had to be protected from spoofing at-
tacks and redirect attacks [32], which allows researchers to build up on a rich
body of knowledge in the field. However, several important di erences must
be noted: nodes in SDN deployments are static, which simplifies the task by
ignoring any mobility or hand-over issues; nodes in SDN deployments are
not constrained in terms of computational power or energy supply, which
allows one to use the full range of cryptographic tools; finally, the network
endpoints which are part of SDN deployments are fundamentally under the
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control of the SDN network provider, which limits their ability to perform
attacks on the network infrastructure.
When it comes to attacks on control plane communications in SDN de-
ployments, possible solutions include enforcing authenticated and encrypted
communication between all the control plane components, as well as secure
enrollment mechanism for management applications and data plane devices.
• All communication between control plane components must the au-
thenticated, and a secure enrollment mechanism for management ap-
plications and data plane devices must be in place.
Lack of a trust chain between the management applications and
the data plane.
While the e ort on defining the SDN architecture is still in progress,
it is clear that management applications belong to a di erent security do-
main than the network operating system, and can be launched by malicious
administrators or issue conflicting policies. Both detecting and preventing
malicious policy deviations is challenging: a tenant can only observe the
tra c after a change has been applied, but can not obtain and examine
snapshots of the data plane forwarding information base (FIB); similarly,
there is no mechanism to establish a trust chain between tenant commands
and entries in the FIB. Possible solutions can be adapted from the ones em-
ployed – with varying success – on platform operating systems: verification
of code origin and information flow control; however, such mechanisms do
not satisfy malicious policy detection requirements.
• Amechanism must be in place to o er traceability and non-repudiation
for all configuration commands and policies issued by network man-
agement applications.
Attacks on policies and rules in programmable networks.
Even if the integrity of policies remains intact, the adversary may issue
malicious policies that modify or disable the e ect of legitimate policies
already in place (specifically in the scenario with such network management
applications implement functionality of network middleboxes). This type of
attack is di cult to detect and prevent, since the malicious policies might be
indistinguishable from legitimate ones up to the point when the combined
policy is deployed (furthermore, it requires a robust definition of a “malicious
policy”). Possible solutions are to establish policy hierarchies and perform
policy integration verification against some pre-determined invariants prior
to deployment, to ensure that the resulting modifications remain within
the basic policy framework. As policy updates may occur interactively in
response to changing network patterns, both static analysis of policies and
a pre-deployment simulation may be required.
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Further, a set of existing challenges for policy verification and enforce-
ment in SDN deployments are outlined in [33], such as verification of liveness
properties, interleaved execution, determining verification time, enforcing
non-interference, and finally sandboxing network applications.
We identify the following minimal principles to reduce the impact of
attacks on policies and rules in programmable networks:
• A mechanism must be in place to enforce strong network policy isola-
tion, such that the e ects of policies in a certain tenant domain have
no e ect on other domains. Furthermore, the infrastructure provider
must be able to enforce strict boundaries on the e ects of policies
within tenant domains.
• New network management policies must run through an integration
verification engine prior to deployment, to minimize or exclude the
e ect of malicious policies on the network configuration.
Resource limit violation.
A malicious tenant may deploy network management applications that ex-
ploit vulnerabilities in network service isolation in order to gain network
resources beyond the allocated quota defined in the QoS agreement. Possi-
ble solutions include adding network operating system capabilities for fine-
grained monitoring of management applications to prevent resource over-
allocation. This in turn requires a well-defined network resource model based
on clear definitions of network resources and their respective capacities.
• A mechanism must be in place to ensure that network management ap-
plications do not allocate resources beyond the assigned quota. To do
this, the NOS may apply advanced policing mechanisms – e.g. based
on existing extensions, such as in [34] – that keep fine-grained track-
ing of management applications resource utilization and prevent them
from making over-allocations.
Attacks on virtual switches and network gateways.
As pointed earlier, an adversary that controls a virtual network infras-
tructure component (such as a virtual switch) can attempt to impersonate
other virtual net- work infrastructure components, spoof tra c and nega-
tively a ect tenant isolation. Possible solutions include integrity verification
of virtual network infrastructure components and protecting the crypto-
graphic secrets necessary for network access using a hardware root of trust.
• Integrity of virtual network components must be verified prior to de-
ployment and the cryptographic material required for their network
access must be protected with a hardware root of trust.
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Weak bandwidth isolation as attack vehicle.
One of the consequences of NIC virtualization is a weakening of QoS guar-
antees, since most NIC virtualization implementations do not support guar-
anteed bandwidth [35]. While this does not directly a ect data integrity and
confidentiality, manipulating bandwidth allocation between tenants sharing
a resource can be used in order to force a policy change (e.g. trigger a more
permissive policy that is activated when the available bandwidth falls below
a certain threshold). Possible solutions include widespread proliferation of
bandwidth isolation techniques such as described in [36], as well as including
the e ects of bandwidth changes into network policy security testing.
• Policy-based routing decisions must not be a ected by vulnerabilities
in bandwidth isolation between tenants. To clarify, consider a network
setup with two types of paths: low-bandwidth, low-cost, low-security
permanent paths (type-A paths) and high-bandwidth, high-cost, high-
security switched paths (type-B paths). Consider further that a legit-
imate tenant has configured a policy to distribute di erent types of
tra c (low-value and high-value tra c) among the type-A and type-B
paths respectively. An adversary capable of modifying the bandwidth
allocated to the paths of the legitimate tenant should not succeed in
redirecting high-value tra c through type-A paths.
• Software and hardware network components must o er equally strong
bandwidth isolation properties. In the current networks, the data
plane components include both software switches and routers deployed
on commodity platforms and specialized hardware equipment imple-
mented with application-specific integrated circuits. As pointed out
in [23], software-based data plane components lack many of the fea-
tures currently implemented in specialized hardware switches and routers.
Strong bandwidth isolation is one of the features which must be im-
proved in the software implementations.
Information leakage between network slices.
The risk of leaking information through side-channel attacks is another as-
pect that emphasizes the importance of isolation between network slices.
Collocated virtual network tenants sharing common physical infrastructure
may infer information by analyzing observed tra c patterns and based on
the changes in their own available bandwidth. Strengthening bandwidth
isolation, as mentioned above, is one approach to address this. Another
e ective approach is end-to-end encryption of network flows. Increased se-
curity awareness and privacy concerns among end-users – as well as the
attempts by service providers to protect from competitors the valuable an-
cillary information created by end-users during service consumption – have
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led to an increasing proportion of network tra c being encrypted7. However,
end-to-end encryption negatively a ects the capability of network infrastruc-
ture providers to perform content optimization, deploy TCP optimization
proxies, implement caching functions, as well as deploy network security
monitoring [37].
The relevant stakeholders must identify solutions that would allow to
deploy the optimizations needed for network infrastructure scalability that
can be e ectively applied for encrypted tra c.
7OpenWave Mobility Press Release: http://owmobility.com/press-release/
over-80-of-traffic-on-mobile-networks-will-be-encrypted-in-12-months
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6 Conclusions
In this technical report we have reviewed the expectations towards 5G and
its security considerations. It is apparent that the use-cases and business-
cases for 5G will introduce a novel set of requirements and will cover a wide
range of devices, beyond smartphones. 5G must be seen as an infrastructure
of heterogeneous technologies, extending the support of devices over actual
mobile telecommunications, with enhancements made not only in the radio
access technology and core networks.
The service-oriented approach in 5G will require an open network archi-
tecture and increased logical separation in the 5G infrastructure, with 5G
Slices consisting of a number network functions and radio access technology
settings that support a specific set of use cases or business cases, and will
cover all parts of the infrastructure. The 5G Slices will be enabled by API
calls to the 5G network. This approach will require an increased depen-
dence on software to control the infrastructure, and the trustworthiness of
such software becomes vital for the success of 5G.
In this report we have briefly reviewed historical development of the
authentication and key agreement protocol, as an example of incremental
evolution of security in mobile telecommunications. We have also discussed
known attacks on LTE networks, which must be mitigated in 5G. Further-
more, new actors and business models will require di erent trust models for
5G: the existing models assume a friendly environment between operators
and devices, which is not true in today’s networks – as demonstrated by
the recent leaks. Hence, the security architecture for 5G must be aligned
with new trust models. Lastly, the documented exceptions made from the
3GPP security working group recommendations, such as those mentioned in
Section 5.2, must be accompanied by the exception’s design rationale, and
an analysis of its complications and any threats it impose.
We describe a proposed architecture for authentication, authorization
and accounting for 5G. Today’s authentication methods – which is the foun-
dation of AAA with secure identification of services, end-points and users –
will not scale with the expected boom of IoT devices. Furthermore, exist-
ing authorization methods are insu cient to support resource-constrained
devices. The new architecture will bring a distributed approach for authen-
tication and convey new models for granular access control decisions.
In this technical review, we have motivated the fact that incremental
changes will not su ce in 5G to support the new use-cases, and new actors
that bring new trust models. The AAA protocols will need to be extended
to support the expected billions of IoT devices that will depend on 5G for
communication. We have also provided a brief insight into software-defined
networking and its security considerations. Finally, considering many of the
future requirements of 5G can not be imagined today, the infrastructure and
the security must be flexible enough to adapt to future needs.
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